Speaker 1 (00:00):
We will be NTSB Chairman Jennifer Homendy, as well as IIC or Investigator-in-Charge Brice Banning, B-R-I-C-E B-A-N-N-I-N-G.
Jennifer Homendy (00:17):
Good afternoon, and thank you for joining us. Today, we're issuing our preliminary report of the midair collision involving a US Army Sikorsky UH-60 Lima or Black Hawk and PSA Airlines doing business as American Airlines Flight 5342 over the Potomac River in Washington D.C. on January 29th. As a reminder, our preliminary reports are just that. They are preliminary. We still have a lot of work to do in this investigation, so the report contains only the facts that we're able to validate and release at this time. If we still have questions on something or there's an area that we need to do more investigative work on, we're going to do that work and that takes time. What we're not going to do is release unverified information, which would only mislead the public, regulators, and others. Also, since I'm level setting here, this report does not include any analysis. That comes later in our investigation.
(01:31)
Right now, we are still in the fact finding phase of this investigation. I often say that the easiest and quickest part of the investigation is determining what happened. The part that takes longer is the how and why. The NTSB prides itself on being the global leader in accident investigations. We are thorough and we're fact-based. Those facts, the evidence, serve as the foundation for our analysis, our probable cause, our findings, and our safety recommendations. Generally, the preliminary report we're releasing today discusses crew experience in terms of flight hours, the history of the flights, much of which was released in my last press conference. Information on the recorders, we still have a lot of work to do in this area as the Black Hawks combined cockpit voice and flight data recorder does not record date information, time information, or helicopter position information. And as I mentioned in the last press conference, there is inconsistency in the data, which led us to declare the pressure altitude parameter on the Black Hawk as invalid.
(03:05)
We're now in the process of determining whether that may have affected other helicopter systems that used pressure altitude as a data source, such as the altimeters. The report also contains information on the operators, the aircraft involved, air traffic control at the time of the crash, helicopter routes, the airport, emergency response and recovery operations, and the wreckage exams. But what I want to focus on this afternoon is our issuance of a recommendation report that contains two urgent safety recommendations to the Federal Aviation Administration or FAA, concerning the helicopter routes near DCA. Urgent recommendations require immediate action to prevent similar accidents or incidents. When we issue them, we believe a critical safety issue must be addressed without delay. For this investigation, we're reviewing airport operations and prior incidents, including near mid-air collision events. Information gathered from voluntary safety reporting programs and the FAA regarding encounters between helicopters and commercial aircraft, near DCA show that from 2011 through 2024, a vast majority of reported events occurred on approach to landing.
(04:53)
Initial analysis found that at least one traffic alert and collision avoidance system or TCAS resolution advisory was triggered per month from 2011 through 2024 at DCA due to proximity to a helicopter. TCAs resolution, advisories or RAs, unlike traffic advisories or TAs, are recommended escape maneuvers, for example, climb or descend, level off. Keep in mind that a TA is issued when the intruding aircraft is about 20 seconds from the closest point of approach or 0.3 nautical miles, whichever occurs first. They are advisory. RAs indicate a collision threat and require immediate action. In over half of the encounters we reviewed again, from 2011 through 2024, the helicopter may have been above the route altitude restriction. Two-thirds of the events occurred at night. We then reviewed commercial operations at DCA and found that between October, 2021 and December, 2024, there were a total of 944,179 commercial operations at DCA. These are instrument flight rules or IFR departures or arrivals. Again, that number is 944,179 commercial operations at DCA.
(06:45)
During that time, again, October, 2021 through December, 2024, there were 15,214 occurrences or close proximity events between commercial airplanes and helicopters in which there was a lateral separation distance of less than one nautical mile and vertical separation of less than 400 feet. There were 85 recorded events that involved a lateral separation of less than 1500 feet and vertical separation of less than 200 feet. As a result of the accident, US Department of Transportation Secretary Sean Duffy took swift action to ensure safety and restrict helicopter traffic from operating over the Potomac River at DCA until March 31st, and I want to commend him for that and commend the work of the FAA to also take swift action. As that deadline nears, we remain concerned about the significant potential for a future midair collision at DCA, which is why we are recommending a permanent solution today. On the chart to my right is a cross-section of the airspace that extends from Runway 33 center line spanning from the runway to the East Bank of the Potomac River.
(08:28)
The figure shows the separation distance that would exist according to FAA charts, with a helicopter on Route 4 and an airplane descending on the glide slope to Runway 33. As stated in my last press conference and confirmed by the FAA, helicopter routes established by the FAA have no lateral boundaries, and the Baltimore Washington Helicopter route chart includes no warning for helicopters to operate a defined distance from the shoreline. So this shaded region right here represents an approximation of the area in which helicopters could be flown. We know that the helicopter on the accident date was not in this area, it was to the west, but at the maximum altitude here of just 200 feet, a helicopter operating over the eastern shoreline of the Potomac River would have just 75 feet of vertical separation from an airplane approaching Runway 33, 75 feet. That distance decreases if the helicopter is operated farther from the shoreline, and again, this helicopter, the Black Hawk was operated farther to the west.
(09:58)
We've determined that the existing separation distances between helicopter traffic operating on Route 4 and aircraft landing on Runway 33 are insufficient and pose an intolerable risk to aviation safety by increasing the chances of a mid-air collision at DCA. Let me repeat that. They pose an intolerable risk to aviation safety. We are therefore recommending today that the FAA permanently prohibit operations on helicopter Route 4 between Haynes Point and the Wilson Bridge when Runways 15 and 33 are being used for departures and arrivals at DCA. Now, we recognize that a total closure of helicopter 4 between Haynes Point and the Wilson Bridge during times when Runway 15 and Runway 33 are in use would restrict a vital aviation corridor used for law enforcement activity, Coast Guard patrols and continuity of government operations.
(11:11)
Additionally, mandating that controllers hold helicopters in place north or south of DCA while airplanes are operating on Runway 15 and Runway 33 has the potential to increase risk by adding to controller workload, so we are also recommending that the FAA designate an alternative helicopter route that can be used to facilitate travel between Haynes Point and the Wilson Bridge when that segment of Route 4 is closed. From here, our team has a lot of work to do. We'll conduct a number of simulations including in the Black Hawk simulator, CRJ simulator, ATC Tower simulator, all using the accident inputs and conditions. We'll conduct a comprehensive visibility study for the CRJ flight, the Black Hawk flight and Tower visibility all under night conditions. We will conduct additional interviews in helicopter operations and in air traffic control, and the team will continue to examine the radio altimeters, the barometric altimeters, and additional electronics. With that, I will take questions. Please raise your hand. I will call on you. Please state your name and your affiliation. Yes, sir.
Tom Roussey (12:41):
Tom Roussey with ABC7 here in D.C. It sounds like you're saying the way this was done for years, every day was presenting an intolerable risk. Is that a correct characterization?
Jennifer Homendy (12:53):
Yes, that is a correct characterization. There's a serious safety issue here, which is why we're issuing these urgent safety recommendations. Fortunately, and I am pleased that Secretary Duffy took immediate action, now we need to see that more permanent solution.
Tom Roussey (13:09):
Now that said, the alternate… You recommended an alternate route. Couldn't that take it over homes and potentially create battles there?
Jennifer Homendy (13:15):
That is something that the FAA has to look at, [inaudible 00:13:20] that route, which is why we're not describing a particular route. That is something that we have to look at. [inaudible 00:13:27].
Speaker 4 (13:41):
[inaudible 00:13:35] are you saying today that those exceptions could be removed and no helicopters should be able to fly on that particular route?
Jennifer Homendy (13:43):
And for those who may not hear the question, the question is about the current exceptions, say for presidential helicopter operations, some life-saving helicopter operations, we are not stating that. We are leaving that to the FAA. They'll have to determine what is necessary. What we are saying is that there is a safety risk here and they need to take immediate action.
Speaker 4 (14:07):
And to follow up on the, you said over half of the helicopters in these close, near collisions, I guess you could call them, were above the 200-foot threshold. Do you have any explanation for why that might've been the case? Was it issues with altitude instruments? Were they just ignoring the restrictions?
Jennifer Homendy (14:27):
The question is about the half that we believe was over the altitude restriction for the helicopter, we'll look at that as part of our investigation. Thank you. Pete?
Pete (14:40):
Please characterize how close a margin of 75 feet is and then how angry does it make you that it took a fatal crash, the first fatal crash in the United States in decades for that to expose this issue that was clearly baked into the airspace here?
Jennifer Homendy (15:00):
Well, the question is, could I characterize how close 75 feet is and whether this makes me angry. First, 75 feet is very close. That is far too close of a proximity. We have stated it's an intolerable risk to aviation safety, and we have called on DOT, FAA to take action. With respect to how angry it makes me, it does make me angry, but it also makes me feel incredibly devastated for families that are grieving because they lost loved ones. It shouldn't take a tragedy like this to occur. Unfortunately, one did, and so we are calling on action, but there clearly were indicators where safety trending could have occurred. Fortunately, we have a secretary in place that is taking safety very seriously, but it shouldn't take a tragedy to require immediate action.
Pete (16:13):
Would you call this an oversight given the proximity of the glide path and the helicopter ramp?
Jennifer Homendy (16:17):
The question is whether I would call this an oversight. I would call it… I mean, it's stronger than an oversight, right? The data we have pulled is from a voluntary safety reporting system that FAA could have used any time, that data from October, 2021 through December, 2024. They could have used that information at any time to determine that we have a trend here and a problem here and looked at that route. That didn't occur, which is why we're taking action today. But unfortunately, people lost lives and loved ones are grieving. Sir?
Adam Tuss (16:56):
Yeah. Chair Homendy, Adam Tuss, Channel 4 here in D.C. Have you looked at the frequency of flights at Reagan National Airport, the number of aircraft that are landing day after day, and possibly can make some recommendations there? Is that something you guys could do?
Jennifer Homendy (17:10):
The question is on the number of flights that are landing and departing from DCA and whether we're taking a look at that. Certainly everything is on the table right now as far as our investigation is concerned, and we will look at that. We're certainly going to look at separation distances between landing and departing aircraft as part of our investigation. That's something we would look at, but that's still to be done. Yes?
Speaker 7 (17:37):
BBC News Cloud. I wonder if you could tell us could, this have been prevented with more staffing?
Jennifer Homendy (17:45):
The question is, could this been prevented if there was more staffing, I assume you mean an air traffic control. That is part of our investigation and is part of the analysis phase of our investigation. Right now, we are collecting facts on air traffic control. In our preliminary report today, we will mention that there were five controllers on position. There were nine there, not in the cab, but in the tower, some in the break room. We do know that the helicopter and the local position were combined at 3:40 PM so we are taking a look at that. We do not have any evidence that anybody left. In fact, the controller came back into rotation around 4:27 PM. We also know that the flight data position and the clearance delivery positions we're also combined for the entire day, which is not abnormal.
Speaker 7 (18:48):
If I can just follow up, I mean, you're making these recommendations, but you've got the White House and DOGE potentially making cuts particularly to air traffic control, so I wonder how worried or concerned you might be about it?
Jennifer Homendy (19:03):
The question is about, again, air traffic control staffing and any sort of cuts. I don't want to speak for the secretary. I believe they have a hiring exemption for air traffic controllers. I see his posts on X daily calling for people to apply for air traffic controller positions, so they are actively hiring, and so, that is something he is doing right now.
Speaker 8 (19:35):
Hi. Will [inaudible 00:19:36]. I'm curious as a part of your investigation, if you'll be looking to other states where with regular traffic air airports or other activities, that's why [inaudible 00:19:49] air space in the country where [inaudible 00:19:53].
Jennifer Homendy (19:52):
Yeah. The question is whether we're looking at other airspace where there can be encounters between airplanes and helicopters. That may be part of our investigation. Certainly, we've collected the information. I am pleased that FAA has announced that they've already begun looking at other airports across the nation. I would encourage them to continue to do that work. Yes, Dave?
Speaker 9 (20:20):
Chair Homendy, two questions for you. One, did the board consider making recommendations to the military to have ADS-B out ball helicopter lights in the area because we know that was not operating at the time, and secondly, is it a fair read of these recommendations that it will allow some helicopter traffic that has been previously prohibited? Right, so helicopters that are currently not allowed in that area, if flights are only say, Runway 1, we'll be able to operate.
Jennifer Homendy (20:51):
The last question is about Runway 1. Yes. Our recommendations are focused on Runway 15 and Runway 33 and prohibiting that helicopter traffic when those are in operation. We did not address Runway 1, that can continue. And your other question-
Speaker 9 (21:12):
On ADS-B.
Jennifer Homendy (21:13):
… on ADS-B, we still have a lot of work to do on ADS-B. We know that the CRJ had ADS-B out, they did not have ADS-B in. We do have a lot of work to do with the Black Hawk, not just with this Black Hawk, but we are actually looking fleet wide at the Black Hawk at ADS-B. Number one, we have not been able to rule out that in this helicopter, it wasn't… We're looking at whether it was installed correctly, whether it was programmed correctly, whether there was some sort of malfunction, or whether it was turned off, but we're not just leaving that. To this helicopter, we're looking at it more broadly to really understand how the Army deals with ADS-B. Yes?
Leah Vredenbregt (22:02):
Leah Vredenbregt, Gray Television. In that 13-year span, you said there was at least one air traffic collision avoidance triggered each month. Can you give some context as to what that national average is like for other large airports or other airports near military operations?
Jennifer Homendy (22:18):
The question is on the TCAS alerts that we found at least one every month from 2011 through 2024, and could we characterize that more nationally at other airports? Right now, we're focused on DCA. FAA is looking at other airports and we are pleased with that and encouraging them to do that. We also may look at other airports as part of this investigation.
Speaker 1 (22:42):
Two more questions.
Jennifer Homendy (22:44):
Yes?
Speaker 11 (22:44):
[inaudible 00:22:46].
Jennifer Homendy (22:46):
We'll count that as one.
Speaker 11 (22:46):
Okay, thank you. So going back to the collision and evidence, it seems like there's a lot of red flags. Did anybody raise a red alarm before, or is it just came up because of this incident? And then, going back to the controllers and the combining, do you have any insight into how often that happens, especially at least six hours?
Jennifer Homendy (23:06):
Well, with respect to, there's a question on the controllers and how often they combine. I will say the combined positions of flight data and clearance delivery as we understand it, is pretty normal. With respect to helicopter and local traffic, there are standards that FAA has in place on when they can combine them and they have to seek certain permissions. But as far as data on how often, that is something we are looking at as part of our investigation. And I'm sorry, your second question was?
Speaker 11 (23:38):
Oh, going back to the 1:00, that type of thing, did anybody raise an alarm or did it just come up because you did the deep dive?
Jennifer Homendy (23:47):
Regarding, did anyone raise alarm regarding the TCAS RAs that went off at least once a month? Here's how I'll answer it. The 15,214 occurrences that we identified as close proximity events through with the help of FAA, close proximity events between helicopters and airplanes, between October, 2021 and December, 2024, some of those is information they obtain, a number of those are through voluntary safety reporting systems. So that means somebody did flag it and call it in.
Speaker 11 (24:34):
Is that the [inaudible 00:24:36] report system for that?
Jennifer Homendy (24:39):
Well, ASAP reporting system. Yeah, it's the ASAP reporting system.
Speaker 12 (24:47):
[inaudible 00:24:46], you mentioned, that there was a risk if these permanent changes were not put in place, what would your message be to the many, many people flying in or out of DCA today and in the near future?
Jennifer Homendy (25:00):
Well, today, though, with the exception… The question is what is my message for people flying in and out of DCA? I assume you mean about safety?
Speaker 12 (25:10):
About safety, yes.
Jennifer Homendy (25:11):
I just flew with my daughter out of DCA on a CRJ with PSA Airlines. Aviation is incredibly safe. DCA is where I always fly out of. I say often that your biggest risk is in your personal vehicle when you're going to and from the airport. Aviation is safe. However, there are safety issues and areas where we need to improve to make sure that we are at zero. And so, that is the role of the NTSB in investigating, this is why we issue urgent safety recommendations.
Speaker 12 (25:54):
Thank you very much.
Jennifer Homendy (25:54):
Thank you very much.
Speaker 1 (26:00):
To continue monitoring progress of the investigation, please check ntsb.gov. Thank you.
Jennifer Homendy (26:05):
Hey Eric, can we stay here for a bit?
Speaker 1 (26:13):
Yeah.
Jennifer Homendy (26:13):
Okay. [inaudible 00:26:19].
Speaker 14 (26:59):
It's mostly like an extension of safety recommendations, which [inaudible 00:27:03]. There's no news on crash, with the power line. No, please. Thank you. [inaudible 00:27:28]. They've got the ceasefire. We probably didn't want to do for you.